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:

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on October 6, 2000 (R. 1-3), alleging
that she sustained injuries while deboarding a rail car operated by the Heber Valley
Historic Railroad Authority. After the pleadings were amended, the State filed a motion
to dismiss (R. 70-71) and supporting memorandum (R. 60-69) based on plaintiffs failure
to strictly comply with the notice-of-claim requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. The motion was granted by memorandum decision entered January 16,
2002. Prior to the entry of an order of dismissal with prejudice dated March 4 and filed
March 5, 2002 (R. 119-20), plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on February 11,2002
(R. 111-12). Under Utah R. App. P. 4(c), the premature notice is deemed timely as of the
date the final order was entered. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 2001), as taken from an order over which the Utah Court
of Appeals lacks original appellate jurisdiction.

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1. Does a notice of claim against the State addressed to the attorney general at a
satellite office location fulfill the statutory requirement of Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2001) that notice be "directed and delivered to: . . . (E) the
attorney general11?
Plaintiff fails to identify, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5(A), the point in the
record at which this issue was preserved. While she did raise the issue generally in her
memorandum opposing the State's motion to dismiss (see R. 72-77), she did not make any
argument in the district court based on evidentiary presumptions created by Utah Code
Ann. § 68-3-8.5 (Supp. 2001) or its predecessor statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-37-1 and
-2 (1997). Nor did she contend in the district court that under the rules of statutory
construction contained in section 68^3-12 (Supp. 2001), the legislature intended the
statute to authorize delivery of notice to someone other than the incumbent holder of the
official title. Consequently, these arguments, addressed in Point I of plaintiff s brief
(Aplt. Brief at 4-9), have been waived and are not properly before this Court for review.

2

See Connor v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 972 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1998) (declining to address
argument not raised below).
Standard of Review:
Compliance with the Immunity Act is a prerequisite to vesting a
district court with subject matter jurisdiction over claims against
governmental entities. Accordingly, a district court's dismissal of a case
based on governmental immunity is a determination of law that we afford
no deference. We review such conclusions for correctness.
Wheeler v. McPherson. 2002 UT 16, ^9, 40 P.3d 632 (citations omitted).
2. Where a claim is made against the State, does a notice of claim sent to the
executive director of an independent state agency satisfy the notice requirements of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act?
Plaintiff likewise fails to identify, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), the
point in the record at which this issue was preserved. She did, however, raise the issue in
her memorandum opposing the Stated motion to dismiss. See R. 76-77.
Standard of Review: This issue also involves dismissal of a case based on
governmental immunity and is reviewed without deference foncorrectness. Wheeler.
2002 UT 16 at U9.

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the
issues before the Court is contained in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
Plaintiff filed her complaint and jury demand on October 6, 2000 (R. 1-3), seeking

damages for injuries she sustained while exiting the Heber Creeper, a train operated for
scenic and historic purposes. The complaint was subsequently amended (R. 8-12) to
allege compliance with the notice-of-claim requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act (R. 9, «f 6). The State answered (R. 13-18), raising as a defense that the
claim is barred by the immunity act's provisions (R. 17, Ninth Defense). After a
substitution of its counsel (R. 26-27), the State moved to amend its answer (R. 28-39) in
order to expressly raise a jurisdictional defense (R. 31). The motion was granted
(R. 50-51 and 56-57) over plaintiffs objection (R. 40-44).
Following the filing of its amended answer (R. 52-55), the State moved to dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction (R. 60-71) on the ground that plaintiffs notice of claim
was not served in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (Supp. 2001).
Memoranda were exchanged (R. 72-84 (plaintiffs opposition) and 89-92 (the State's
4

reply)), and a hearing was held on December 13, 2001 (R. 106). On January 16, 2002,
the trial court judge issued a memorandum decision (R. 107-10) dismissing the claim for
plaintiffs failure to properly serve her notice of claim on the attorney general. The court
explicitly rejected plaintiffs alternative argument that notice to the executive director of
the Heber Valley Historic Railroad sufficed to satisfy plaintiffs statutory duty of notice
(R. 109). Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on February 11, 2002 (R. 111-12), which
became effective when the order dismissing the case with prejudice was issued on March
5, 2002 (R. 119-20).
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
Following plaintiffs June 23, 1999 injury, plaintiffs counsel submitted a notice of

claim dated May 2, 2000 (R. 35-38 and 65-68). The notice was addressed to Craig H.
Lacey, the Railroad's executive director, in Heber City, Utah, and to MJan Graham, Utah
State Attorney General, 515 E. 100 S., Salt Lake City, Ut. 84101" (R. 35 and 65). A
certified mail receipt shows that Dawn Grams signed for the copy of the notice directed to
Craig Lacey on June 7, 2000 (R. 44_and 83). A second certified mail receipt for the copy
directed to Jan Graham is simply stamped, "RECEIVED JUN 08 2000 Utah State MailM
(R. 44 and 81). In pages bearing the identification "qwestdex.com," attached as Exhibit A
to plaintiffs memorandum opposing the State's motion to dismiss, the sole entry for 515

5

East 100 South, Salt Lake City, is the Child Support Division of the Attorney General's
Office (R. 79).
No other facts are relevant to the issues before this Court for decision.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has long held that the notice-of-claim provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act require strict compliance. Absent strict compliance, a claim
under the act must be dismissed. Recent decisions have reemphasized that a claim cannot
go forward unless the notice of claim fully complies with the statutory mandates. See,
e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Auth.. 2001 UT 109, 37 P.3d 1156; Brown v. Utah Transit
AutL, 2002 UT 15, 40 P.3d 638.
The sole defendant named in this case is the State of Utah. Statute is clear that for
claims against the State, the notice of claim must be directed and delivered to the attorney
general. In this case, the district court correctly held that a notice sent to a division within
the Attorney General's Office cannot substitute for delivery to the individual serving as
the State's attorney general. As the district court correctly observed, a contrary decision
would lead to the kind of uncertainty regarding notice that the statutory requirements
exist to eliminate.
6

Because plaintiffs notice of claim did not strictly comply with the statute
governing claims against the State, the district court's dismissal of the claim was correct
and is entitled to this Court's affirmance.

ARGUMENT
I. DIRECTING AND DELIVERING NOTICE TO A SATELLITE
DIVISION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE DIRECTION AND DELIVERY TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act controls all claims for injury against
governmental entities:
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity,
or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity
before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (Supp. 2001). The requirement to file a written notice of
claim is mandatory. The statute further prescribes the person to whom notice must be
provided. In each case, the notice is to be directed and delivered to a specified individual:
(b) (ii) (A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an
incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when
the claim is against a school district or board of education;
7

(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is against
a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah;
or
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public board,
commission, or body.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). As the Court
observed in Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, prior to 1998 the notice provisions were
somewhat ambiguous regarding the identity of the person to whom notice must be
delivered. However, in 1998 the legislature clarified the delivery requirements to make
explicit "how, what, when, and to whom a party must direct and deliver a Notice in order
to preserve his or her right to maintain an action against a governmental entity." Greene,
2001 UT 109,1J15. In the Court's words, the amendment "has resolved any potential
ambiguities as to whom the Notice must be delivered." Id. at ^[14. The Court concluded
that "[w]here, as here, the statute is clear, readily available, and easily accessible by
counsel, there is no reason to require anything less than strict compliance." Id. at ^[14.
Plaintiff makes two arguments based on statute: first, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 68-3-8.5 (Supp. 2001), that the existence of a certified mail receipt raises an evidentiary
presumption that the certified mail has been delivered to the person to whom it was
addressed; and second, under section 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii), that under the rules of statutory
construction, the statute contemplates receipt by someone other than the attorney general.
8

As noted above, these arguments were not made in the district court and are consequently
waived for purposes of appeal. 'This rule is based, in part, on the principle that it is
unfair to fault the court for failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never given the
opportunity to consider." Ellis v. Swensen. 2000 UT 101, ^[30, 16 P.3d 1233. Plaintiff
has neither acknowledged this principle nor provided any rationale for ignoring it.
Moreover, even if the Court were to reach these newly raised arguments, neither supports
plaintiff s position.
The Court's observation in Greene that the amendment of section 63-30-11
"clarified] exactly to whom Notices must be directed and delivered" (2001 UT 109, ^|13)
forecloses plaintiffs contention that receipt of notice by someone other than the attorney
general is consistent with the statute (see Aplt. Brief at 5). Her citation to the rules of
construction contained in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(v) for the proposition that
"attorney general" includes other individuals who perform duties falling within the
attorney general's purview is unavailing. The language of subsection (2)(v), in contrast to
other subsections of the same statute, is permissive, not mandatory: "words used to
denote an executive or ministerial officer, may include any . . . other person performing"
the same duties. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(v) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). Every
other subsection but one uses the word "includes" or "means" as its operating verb instead
of the permissive or conditional language; the definition of "town" in subsection (2)(y),
9

which "may mean incorporated town and may include city," is the sole exception (Utah
Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(y) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). It is clear from this disparity
that the distinction between the mandatory and permissive language is intentional. To
hold otherwise would deprive the word "may" of meaning, contrary to the principles of
statutory interpretation articulated by this Court: "We will avoid an interpretation which
renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative." Platts v. Parents
Helping Parents. 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997). Further, "the word 'may' in its most
usual meaning does not import certainty, but uncertainty. That is, that whatever is
referred to, either may or may not be, or occur." Grant v. Utah State Land Bd.. 485 P.2d
1035, 1036 (Utah 1971) (footnote omitted). Consequently, the "rule" cited by plaintiff
does not support her conclusion that the immunity act's statutory reference to "attorney
general" necessarily includes others performing ancillary duties.
Finally, in construing a statute, "[foundational rules require that we assume that
each term of a statute was used advisedly; and that each should be given an interpretation
and application in accord with their [sic] usually accepted meaning, unless the context
otherwise requires." Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 742
(Utah 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Spackman v. Bd. of Educ, 2000 UT
87, 16 P.3d 533; Nelson v. Salt Lake County. 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). Especially
in the context of a list of specific individuals to whom notice must be directed and
10

delivered, interpreting section 63-30-1 l's reference to "the attorney general" as including
someone other than the elected official would contradict both the usually accepted
meaning of the phrase and the context in which it is placed, contrary to the principles
under which the Court interprets statutory language. In accord with these principles, "the
attorney general" in section 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(E) refers to the individual who holds that
office. Plaintiff has provided no contrary authority.
Plaintiffs reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-8.5 is equally misplaced.1 Her
argument that a certified mail receipt evidences receipt by the person to whom the mail
was directed "at a listed address" (Aplt. Brief at 5) proves too much. Under her theory,
she could address a document by certified mail to, for example, the president of a major
university at a remote "listed" campus or to the chief executive officer of a national
corporation at a "listed" manufacturing facility far from the corporate headquarters. As
long as someone, with or without authority, signed the return receipt, the document would
be deemed delivered to the addressee. In this case, plaintiff did not use the listed address
for the executive offices of the Attorney General but directed her notice of claim to an
address specified only for the Child Support Division (see R. 79-80). Such misdirection

Section 68-3-8.5 was no effective until April 30, 2001, well after plaintiff filed her
notice of claim in this case. However, the language on which her argument relies was
formerly found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-2 (1997).
11

does nothing to provide the notice she argues the statute is intended to confer. Moreover,
notice to an assistant attorney general in a satellite office has been held by the Utah Court
of Appeals not to suffice for notice to the attorney general. See Thimmes v. Utah State
Univ., 2001 UT App 93, f7, 22 P.3d 257 (holding notice to the Division of Risk
Management "because an assistant attorney general maintains an office there" ineffective
to comply with statute).
Plaintiff argues that "[i]f the person receiving the certified mail was unauthorized
to accept it, it would have been rejected and Katie Shafer would have sought to deliver it
to a person who could receive notice" (Aplt. Brief at 6). The mail receipt on which
plaintiff relies (R. 44 and 81) shows only that it was stamped "RECEIVED JUN 08 2000
Utah State Mail." Because nothing indicates that State Mail is unauthorized to accept
documents directed to the Child Support Division under the Attorney General's name for
purposes of that Division, there is no reason to believe that State Mail had a duty to reject
a document sent to that address. Rather, it is plaintiffs legal duty to direct and deliver her
notice of claim to the individual explicitly identified by statute.
By suggesting that another person would be authorized to receive the notice of
claim, plaintiff ignores the plain language of the statute and attempts to reintroduce the
very ambiguity into the notice provision that this Court has held the 1998 amendment
cured. What plaintiff seeks, at bottom, is an "actual notice" standard: "Dismissal was
12

inappropriate and must be reversed because there can be no question that the attorney
general received notice of claim11 (Aplt. Brief at 6). The Court has repeatedly and
conclusively rejected this position. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Granite Sch. DisU 531 P.2d
480, 482 (Utah 1975) ("We have consistently held that where a cause of action is based
upon a statute, full compliance with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right
to maintain a suit"); Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36, T|19, 977 P.2d 1201 ("We
have consistently required strict compliance with the requirements of the Immunity Act.
Actual notice does not cure a party's failure to meet these requirements"); Greene. 2001
UT 109, ^|15, 37 P.3d 1156. Given these precedents and the plain language of the statute,
plaintiff has provided no grounds on which to disturb the district court's decision.
II. NOTICE PROVIDED TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF AN
INDEPENDENT STATE AGENCY DOES NOT FULFILL THE
STATUTORY MANDATE FOR NOTICE TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL.
Plaintiff briefly argues that section 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(F) provides an alternative to
notice on the attorney general because the Heber Valley Historic Railroad Authority,
which operates the Heber Creeper, "is a public corporation created by statute'1 (Aplt. Brief
at 13). She contends that the notice of claim delivered to Craig Lacey, the Authority's
executive director, is sufficient to fulfill her statutory duty of notice. See Aplt. Brief at
13-14 ("Based on the admission by the State that it maintains Heber Valley and the
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receipt of notice by Mr. Lacey, the district court erred in concluding that notice to be
ineffective. Accordingly, the dismissal must be reversed because all pleadings and
admissions indicate adequate notice was delivered11).
The statute belies plaintiffs construction. Under section 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(F),
notice upon Mr. Lacey as executive director of the Heber Valley Historic Railroad
Authority would be effective only were the claim against a public board, commission, or
body other than the State or the entities specifically listed in subparts (b)(ii)(A) through
(D) of the statute. Because the State is the sole defendant in the present case, any notice
to Mr. Lacey is irrelevant to the determination of whether the attorney general was
adequately served.2 Again, plaintiff is relying on an "actual notice11 standard for which
she neither provides case precedent nor acknowledges precedents against her position.
Her abbreviated analysis cannot be credited and provides no basis to reverse the district
court's dismissal of the case.

2

Plaintiff s invitation to stay this appeal pending the outcome of a newly filed case
(see Aplt. Brief at 14 n.3) should be rejected. The issues that she identifies the new case
as raising, application of the savings statute and governmental function analysis, are not
relevant to the issue before the Court in the present case; however, the resolution of the
present case may well affect the viability of a new trial court action. Moreover, no
motion to stay has been properly submitted for the Court's consideration.
14

CONCLUSION
The notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act unmistakably identify
the attorney general as the individual to whom notice of a claim against the State must be
directed and delivered. Mailing notice to a subsidiary office staffed only by assistant
attorneys general does not comply with the statute. Because, as the Court has held, the
statute is clear and unambiguous, it requires strict compliance. The district court
correctly concluded that plaintiff did not comply with the statute's strictures, and its
dismissal of plaintiff s claim on this ground warrants affirmance here.
For these reasons, as more fully explained above, the State respectfully requests
the Court to affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal.
DATED this ^ 4 i

day of June, 2002.

<^ZjUC
NANCY L. KEMP
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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